5 March 2026

Rare Earth Elements and Mineraria Gerrei project

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Executive Summary

Rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of 17 chemically similar metals (15 lanthanides plus yttrium and often scandium) that are indispensable for high‑performance magnets, advanced electronics, optical technologies, catalysts, and specialised alloys. Their strategic importance is driven less by absolute geological scarcity and more by (i) the technical difficulty of separating near‑identical elements, (ii) the concentration of refining and magnet manufacturing capacity, and (iii) environmental and permitting constraints that slow new capacity build‑out. 

For the European economy, REEs (especially magnet REEs such as neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), dysprosium (Dy), and terbium (Tb)) sit at a “choke point” in electrification and automation value chains: electric vehicle traction motors, certain wind turbine generator designs, industrial motors, robotics, and defence‑relevant systems. The European Commission’s policy response now centres on the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which sets 2030 capacity benchmarks for strategic raw materials (10% extraction, 40% processing, 25% recycling) and a diversification goal (no more than 65% dependency on any single third country at any relevant processing stage). 

Trade data underline continued import exposure: in 2024, the EU imported 12,900 tonnes of “REE+” (rare earth elements as defined in Eurostat’s dataset), with China the largest partner (46.3% by weight), followed by Russia (28.4%) and Malaysia (19.9%). At the same time, global supply chains remain highly concentrated in China—particularly for separation/refining and permanent magnet manufacturing.

Against this backdrop, our concept is framed by a circular‑economy project: recover REEs from fluorspar‑related by‑products and historic waste streams (before/by instead of using those materials as underground backfill), via a dedicated auxiliary plant integrated with the fluorite processing infrastructure.

What Rare Earth Elements Are

Definition and membership.

In industrial and policy contexts, “rare earth elements” generally refers to 17 elements: the 15 lanthanides (La–Lu) plus yttrium (Y), and often scandium (Sc) because it shares geochemical behaviour and is frequently associated in deposits and processing routes. Eurostat uses the concept “REE+” for 17 elements (the lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium).

Light vs heavy REEs.

A common split is:

This distinction matters commercially because HREEs such as Dy and Tb are crucial for high‑temperature magnet performance yet are typically less abundant and more supply‑constrained.

Physical/chemical properties that drive both value and complexity.

REEs share very similar ionic radii and oxidation states (most commonly +3), which is why they occur together in nature and why separation into individual elements is difficult and chemical‑intensive. Magnetism and optical properties are tied to partially filled 4f electron shells, enabling strong magnetic anisotropy (Nd‑Fe‑B magnets) and efficient luminescence (Eu/Tb/Y in phosphors).

Main uses (practically important examples).

Global supply chain facts (mining, processing and concentration).

The upstream mining base is diversifying slowly, but the midstream remains highly concentrated:

World mine production (REO equivalent) in 2025 is reported at ~390,000 t REO. China is listed at 270,000 t, the United States at 51,000 t, and Australia at 29,000 t. 

Separation/refining and magnet manufacturing remain even more concentrated: the IEA reports China at ~91% in separation/refining and about 94% in sintered permanent magnet production (supply‑chain stage shares cited in the IEA commentary).

Why REEs Are Strategic for the European Union

Demand drivers by sector (what can be quantified from official EU material).

EU policy documents focus on REE‑bearing permanent magnets as the highest‑leverage strategic use case.

The European Commission staff working document on strategic dependencies (SWD(2022) 41 final) states: – EU demand for rare‑earth permanent magnets may reach 35,000–40,000 tonnes per year by 2030, up from 18,000 tonnes in 2019, and notes limited EU production capacity (500 tonnes in 2019). 

For e‑mobility, an average electric traction motor contains ~1–2 kg of permanent magnets, described as including ~0.25 kg Nd and ~0.1 kg Dy (order‑of‑magnitude material intensity).
For wind turbines (permanent magnet generator designs), turbines can contain up to 600 kg of permanent magnets per MW, and the document provides an indicative REE composition share for the REE fraction (Dy, Nd, Pr, Tb). In parallel, a Commission thematic page on “rare earth elements, permanent magnets, and motors” states the EU does not produce REEs and that 98% of total rare‑earth magnet demand is met by Chinese imports.

Trade exposure snapshot (Eurostat).

In 2024, the EU imported 12,900 tonnes of REE+ (by weight), down 29.3% from 2023; almost half of imports came from China (46.3%), followed by Russia (28.4%) and Malaysia (19.9%). Criticality and CRMA governance logic. Under the EU’s CRMA framework, rare earths appear in both “critical” and “strategic” categories, with strategic emphasis on the subset used in permanent magnets (Nd, Pr, Tb, Dy, plus others listed in the annex methodology). The Commission also published a dedicated factsheet on “rare earth elements for permanent magnets”, listing Nd, Pr, Tb, Dy, Gd, Sm, and Ce as essential inputs for high‑performance permanent magnets used in EVs, wind turbines, electronics, aerospace and defence, and highlighting end‑of‑life magnets as a future secondary source.

CRMA sets Union‑level 2030 benchmarks (10% extraction, 40% processing, 25% recycling) and the 65% single‑third‑country dependency ceiling (at any relevant processing stage). 

Supply risk and resilience (what recent audits conclude). 

The European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 04/2026 (facts and findings) stresses that renewable energy technologies rely on 26 CRMs, and that the EU relies heavily on non‑EU countries; it also highlights that none of the rare earths used in the EU are processed domestically (as summarised in the ECA factsheet). 

Recycling and substitution prospects (constraints as well as opportunity). – The Commission and CRMA framing treat recycling, recovery from waste, and improved circularity as structural levers for resilience.
– Yet, both the USGS rare earths datasheet and the ECA factsheet illustrate why near‑term scale is hard: recycling volumes are described as limited, and significant shares of REEs are embedded in finished goods (which complicates collection, disassembly, and traceability).
– Substitution is technically possible in some applications but often reduces performance or increases size/weight; the USGS notes substitutes are generally less effective. 

Strategic recommendations.

A coherent EU strategy—consistent with CRMA benchmarks and audit findings—requires four parallel tracks:

  1. Midstream capacity build‑out (separation/refining and magnet making) to address the most concentrated stages of the value chain.
  2. Permitting acceleration with high environmental integrity, aligned with CRMA’s intent to streamline strategic projects while maintaining standards (as reflected in EU institutional positions).
  3.  Circular supply scaling (collection/recycling of magnets; recovery from extractive waste facilities) where environmental performance and social licence can be materially better than in poorly regulated jurisdictions.
  4. Demand‑side efficiency and design‑for‑recycling, because rapidly growing demand—especially for magnets in EVs and wind—can outpace feasible domestic supply by 2030 without moderation.

What Mineraria Gerrei Is Doing

Our company is working on a project that sees rare earths as a by‑product / secondary‑stream recovery opportunity rather than a greenfield mine:

University of Naples identified “significant quantities” of REEs in materials linked to the mine, distributed both in historic waste and in‑situ reserves as future by‑products.

The operational concept is to evaluate and recover REEs from fluorite processing by‑products before using those materials as underground backfill, via a “small auxiliary plant” integrated with the main fluorspar plant under construction.

The stated technical challenge is that an industrial process to liberate/enrich the REE‑bearing minerals in Silius is not available “off the shelf”; the process must be developed with a staged approach (lab tests → pilot plant → industrial deployment).

Partners currently involved in such development are the Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) for lab‑scale process development/testing and Metso for engineering and equipment deployment once a flowsheet is validated, with financing logic tied to reaching TRL 4 for eligibility to many national/EU funds. 

EIT RawMaterials already showed interest as a potential funder.

Geology/mineralogy anchor from peer‑reviewed literature (what can be stated rigorously).

 A peer‑reviewed Periodico di Mineralogia paper on Silius (Mondillo et al., 2017) provides explicit quantitative and mineralogical context:

These figures are central for any rigorous assessment of the project’s scale: the grades are sub‑percent (ppm‑level), implying that economic viability hinges on low‑cost recovery from streams that are already mined/processed for fluorite and on achieving a high‑selectivity pre‑concentration step. 

The quantities identified by the University of Naples refer exclusively to rare earth elements contained within the certified fluorspar reserves and the associated carbonate gangue streams already quantified from a mining perspective. Accordingly, these estimates do not account for any additional volumes that may result from an expansion of economically exploitable resources and reserves. 

In this context, the mineral exploration activities promoted by us aimed at enlarging the extractable fluorite reserve base and refining the geological model, could proportionally increase the volumes of rare earth elements potentially available, thereby strengthening the project’s forward-looking resource profile.

Economic benefits claimed vs economically decisive unknowns.

The benefits are strategic (EU resilience), environmental (circularity, responsible supply) and local (jobs/investment through mine restart).